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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an action to review a final order of the
Industrial Commission of Utah—Board of Review denying Plaintiff benefits for a period of fifty-two weeks and assessing
the Plaintiff with the liability to repay $1,217.00 received
by Plaintiff during such period of disqualification, and
declaring him inelgible to receive future benefits until
full repayment is made by Plaintiff to the Department of
Employment Security.
DISPOSITION BELOW
Plaintiff submitted a signed statement regarding
his claims for benefits on January 7> 1976.

He W E S served

with a notice of hearing and appeared before a Hearings
Representative on February 17, 1976.

The decision on Plain-

tiff's future rights to Unemployment benefits was rendered
March 2,

1976.

Plaintiff appealed to the Appeal Referee and

a hearing was held April 14, 1976.

From a decision affirming

the prior decision, Plaintiff appealed to the Board of Review,
wherein the prior decisions were affirmed in an opinion rendered June 30, 1976.

This appeal is taken from that final

decision of the Board of Review of the Industrial Commission
for the State of Utah.
REIIEF SOUGHT
Plaintiff filed this Writ of Review seeking
reversal of the Order of the Commission and & ruling and
determination by this Court thc.t Plaintiff shall be elgible
to receive future benefits during such times as he may be
1
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unemployed and elgible to receive benefits; that Plaintiff
shall be declared not inelgible to receive benefits for the
period beginning May 31, 197 5, for fifty-two weeks thereafter;
and that the decision assessing a liability for overpayment
in the amount of $1,217.00 be reversed and otherwise set aside.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiff was employed as a carpenter during all
times material to this appeal.

He is a member of the Car-

penters Union, Local 184, and was sent out on jobs through
the union as work became available.

During the four calendar

quarters beginning with the fourth quarter of 19743 Plaintiff
was employed by 7 different employers for a total of 22 weeks.
Plaintiff was mailed Form 6C5, Notice of Monetary Determination on January 5, 1976, and was determined elgible for
benefits. (Appendix page 1.)
Plaintiff was requested to submit a Statement
Regarding Claim for Benefits, Form 6l5-C. (R. 2 1)

It does

appear that this form was completed by a representative of
the Department of Employment Security, and signed by the
Plaintiff.

It was noted thereon that "the claimant speaks

broken English and seems confused about Unemployment Insurance in general."

(R. 21)

The scope cf that inquiry

was apparently limited to a question of whether plaintiff
was employed on May 30, 197 5.
per hour at that time.

Plaintiff was earning$7.6l

He stated that he could have earned

about $55.00 per day during that period of time.

He further

stated that if he had worked on that day, that he did not
know why it could have gone unreported on his claim for
benefits for that week.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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On February 1 0 , 1976, plaintiff was mailed a
notice to attend a hearing on February, 1 7 , 1976, in order
to determine whether he had violated provisions of Section
35-4-5

(e) U.C.A. 1953.

(R. 1 8 )

The decision of the Hearings

Representative rendered March 2, 1976, concluded that plaintiff had failed to report working on May 30, 1976, and did
further conclude that plaintiff f s conduct constituted a
knowing withholding of a material fact.

As a consequence

plaintiff was disqualified from receiving benefits for the
52 week period beginning with the week ending May 31 * 1975 •
As a consequence of the disqualification, the benefits paid
to plaintiff during various periods of unemployment after
that date, and prior to the date of hearings, were "overpayments", and plaintiff was determined to be liable for
the immediate repayment of those amounts.
At that hearing plaintiff contended that he did
not withhold material information in order to receive benefits.
On April 14, 1976, plaintiff appeared before the
Appeals Referee and testified again concerning the date of
employment.

He was examined by the Referee.

The transcript

made therefrom appears at the Record, p. 11-15.

The line

of questioning by the Referee was essentially similar to
that of the Hearings Representative.
It was established that plaintiff had begun
work for the McKee Construction Company on May 30, 1975,
and that he was laid off due to reduction in force on July 1,
1975* and that he thereafter made additional claims for
benefits.

Plaintiff again denied wilfully failing to

report the fact of being employed for the one day, and for
being entitled
to receive
the J.amount
of School,
$^~.0?
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reported that amount, even though he had not yet been paid.
It appears that the inquiry described hereinabove
was based upon inquiry of the Department of Employment
Security to McKee Construction dated November 20, 197 5.
(R. 22)

Reference is made throughout the findings of

the Agency representatives to information"subsequently
developed" that plaintiff may have worked for one day which
was not reported.

It also appears that no other notice was

forwarded to plaintiff concerning the inquiry of McKee.
In spite of the fact that plaintiff has consistently denied a wilful and knowing withholding of
information, and stated that he had made a mistake on
his claim card for the week in question, the decisions
were adverse to him.

It appears that some considerable

weight was placed on the fact that he had received the
"handbook" from the Department, and that on at least two
prior ftccassions involving partial benefit weeks, the
plaintiff had correctly filled out his claim cards.
It was observed by the Referee that the finding
of overpayment results in a very severe penalty, but was
of the opinion that the statute does not vest any discretion
in the Department of Employment Security to compromise any
portion of such a claim.
The summary of weekly benefits received by Plaintiff herein is included in the Record as page 8, and set
forth herein as Appendix page 2.

The question is raised

thereunder of the correctness of the calculation of the
amounts allegedly due from plaintiff to the Department of
Employment Security.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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POINT I: THE DECISION OF THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION TO
DENY BENEFITS BASED UPON RETROACTIVE DISQUALIFICATION OF
PLAINTIFF AND TO THEREBY REQUIRE REPAYMENT OF AMOUNTS
RECEIVED IS CONTRARY TO THE PURPOSES OF THE UNEMPLOYMENT
COMPENSATION LAWS AND AGAINST PUBLIC POLICY AND AMOUNTS TO
A DENIAL OF PLAINTIFF'S RIGHTS TO DUE PROCESS OF LAW
This appeal presents the issue as to the proper
interpretation and application of Utah Statutes regarding
Unemployment Compensation pursuant to Chapter 4,

Title 35,

Utah Code Annotated 1953* and specifically examines the
application of 35-4-5

(e) and 35-4-6

(d) and (e) to the

facts of this case.
It has long been established that public policy
underlying Unemployment Compensation is as follows:
Economic insecurity due to unemployment is a serious
menace to the health, morals, and welfare of the people
of this state. ... subject requiring action by legislature to prevent its spread and to lighten the burden
upon the unemployed worker.... social security requires
protection against this greatest hazard of our economic life. ... the public good, and the general welfare
...require ..free? public employment offices and for.,
compulsory setting aside of unemployment reserves to be
used for the benefit of unemployed persons." J[/

1.

Utah Code Annotated 35-4-2

5
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This principle was recently reaffirmed in the
case of California Department of Human Resources Development
vs> Java.

2/

The Supreme Court of the United States held

that the congressional objective in enacting Sec.301-303 of
the Social Security Act

(42 USC Sec 501-503) was to provide

for wages lost during a period of unemployment not the employee1s
fault.

2j

The Java decision contains a cogent analysis of

the purposes and objectives of the Unemployment Compensation
system, and emphasizes the close interrelationship between
the States and the Federal Government in funding the benefits
available for unemployed workers.
The Supreme Court of California recently construed
the statute of that State allowing the state to recover an
overpayment of unemployment benefits in the light of the
Java decision.

4/

The California Court held that the statute

providing that any person overpaid unemployment benefits is
liable for the amount overpaid unless the overpayment was
received without fault on the part of the recipient, and its
recovery would be against equity and good conscience, does
not permit recoupment of overpayment on sole ground that
recipient had been notified of possibility of liability but
also requires consideration of the nature and cause of the
overpayment, the hardship to the recipient that repayment may

2.

402 U.S. 121, 28 L. Ed. 2d 666, 91 S. Ct. 1347 (1971)

3.

Ibid, at page 130 of 402 U.S. Reports

4.

Gilles vs. Department of Human Resources Development
113 Cal. Rptr. 374, 521 P. 2d 110, (1974)

6
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impose, and the effect, if any, that repayment would have
upon the fulfillment of the objectives of the unemployment
compensation laws, and further holding that the statute permitting collection of overpayments by setoff against future
unemployment benefits does not conflict with the Social Security Act.

In Gilles the issue involved whether employee

discharged for alleged misconduct, and having been found initially
elgible, was entitled to receive benefits pending determination
of appeal by employers, and whether, in event of adverse
determination of elgibility on appeal, were required to repay
amounts received as overpayment^. J>/
The Court found support in federal court decisions
construing section 204 of the Social Security Act (42 USC
Sec. 404) > which prohibits recovery of overpayments from"any
person who is without fault if such adjustment or recovery
would defeat the purpose of this subchapter or would be
against equity and good conscience."

j6/ It is clear that

the federal decisions require that there be taken into account
the origin of the overpayment, the extent to which the recipient changes his position in reliance on the receipt of benefits,
and the impact of recoupment upon the recipientfs current
financial position.

5.

Ibid, 521 P. 2d at page 115.

6.

Ibid, 52 1 P. 2d at page 117* and cases and decisions cited.

7
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In Gilles, supra, it is expressly stated"that
the provisions of the Unemployment Insurance Code must be
liberally construed to further the legislative objectives."

jj

And the Court cites with approval language from Java, supra
regarding the objectives of Unemployment benefits, which include providing cash to a newly unemployed worker at a time
when otherwise he would have nothing to spend, serving to maintain the recipient at subsistence levels without the necessity
of his turning to welfare or private charity, and emphasizing
that the early payment of insurance benefits serves to prevent a decline in the purchasing power of the unemployed,
which in turn serves to aid industries producing goods and
services. 8/
In the case at bar, a careful review of the record
reveals that plaintiff herein was apparently confused and
unsure of his obligations under the reporting requirements,
and consistently denied making false statements or intentional
omissions for purposes of gaining benefits to which he was
not entitled.

It further appears that plaintiff was not

given notice that he could be required to make full repayment
of amounts received subsequent to May 31, 197 5, to date, at
the initial interview on January 7, 1976. It appears that
his sole reason to seek benefits was due to the nature of
his employment, something which is common to many members of
trade unions employed in the construction industry, namely,
~

Ibid, at 521 P. 2d at page 118.

3.

Ibid.
8
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periods of regular employment for several weeks or jnonth^,
usually terminating for periods of several weeks due to a
reduction in force or temporary layoffs, before again finding
regular employment.

There is no question that plaiptiff was

in fact unemployed during each of the weeks subsequent to
May 31> 1975* when he applied for benefits; and it is equally
clear that plaintiff was unaware of any reason why those benefits
could be later determined to have been "overpaid."
It is submitted that any overpayments allegedly
received by plaintiff were receivedMwithout fault" as defined
and within the meaning of 35-4-6(e) and it is further submitted
that plaintiff was entirely without fault in requesting benefits
and is otherwise entitled to same, without liability for
repayment of any kind. Plaintiff's unemployment was clearly
due to no fault of his own.
A recent decision by the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania held a statute of that state,which is similar to the
Utah Statute allowing recoupment of overpayments, to violate
the 14th Amendment of the United States Constitution and to
violate the equal protection clause, as applied in that case, j)/
The facts are similar, in that the claimant was initially
found elgible for benefits, but that information subsequently
developed from the employer revealed that claimant had apparently voluntarily left work. Upon discovery of the error, the
liability for overpayment was assessed seeking recovery of
benefits previously paid.
9.

That Court also cites with approval

Unemployment Compensation Board of Review vs. Selby,
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Pa. Cmwlth.,
360Machine-generated
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(1976)
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the public policy considerations enunciated in Java, supra,
and Gilles, supra/
Plaintiff respectfully submits that the interpretation
by the Industrial Commission, through its various hearing
representatives, referees, and the Board of Review, of 35-4-5
U.C.A, 1953> as evidenced by its procedures, and by its decisions
in this case, offend the Constitutional and statutory principles
hereinabove set forth.
The determination that plaintiff is inelgible for
any future benefits until the sum of $1,217.00 is repaid, and
is further subject to collection through civil process in the
same manner as any other judgment debtor, is erroneous, and
should be set aside by this court.

POINT II:

THE DECISION OF THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION IS

NOT SUPPORTED BY COMPETENT SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE AND IS
ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS
The record in this matter is clear that plaintiff
has a great deal of difficulty with the English language. It
further appears that there was a considerable delay in the
notice given plaintiff that the Department of Employment
Security was seeking recoupment of a substantial sum from
plaintiff.

The hearings were investigated, adjudicated, ana

reviewed by a single agency.

It has been held that in at

least some instances this amounts to a denial of due process
of lawj where there is a power to discipline and a power
to investigate, a medical board did not qualify as an
Digitized
Howard «
W.
Law Library, J. Reuben
* by
^ the-4--i
-iHunter
unmaker.
10/ Clark Law School, BYU.
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Although the Department of Employment Security
concedes that the consequences of disqualification are harsh
and severe, it is contended that the statute allows no
discretion.

It is submitted that the provisions of the

statute allow for such discretion, and that fundamental
fairness required by law is violated in not resolving
contested questions raised by the evidence in favor of the
plaintiff.

If, in fact, the disqualification is result of

the failure to understand the duties imposed by law on the
part of the plaintiff, the result becomes harsh indeed.
There is precedent that cruel and unusual penalties
are a violation of the Constitution of the United States 11/
and apply as well toncivil"penalties as to those imposed
through the criminal statutes.

There can be no dispute

that the application of the fraud provisions of the Utah
Unemployment Compensation statute is in the nature of a
penalty.

The penalty may not be justified in terms of

public policy due to the adverse impact on the plaintiff
financially, causing great hardship.

Nor may it be justified

due to the apparent unjust enrichment ttetderives in favor
of the State.
*±^ u.s. const. Amend. VIII; Trop v. Dulles 356 U.S. 86 (1948)
CONCLUSION
64 Harv. L. Rev. 271(1950)
Plaintiff respectfully submits that the decision
rendered by the Board of Review is erroneous and should
be reversed and otherwise set aside, and that plaintiff be
declared elgible to receive future benefits, if qualified and
elgible, and that the requirement for repayment of "overDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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paymentn be set aside.
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